Sisterhood and Solidarity: A Feminist Utopia

“Intra-sexual competitive behavior remains a major barrier to women’s full inclusion in the university workplace, and we would be wise to break it down.”

A considerable number of feminists advocate greater sisterhood; in the face of male-produced and reproduced violence, women would find solidarity, support, comfort, and help among other women. I believe this as problematic as Marx’s idealized class consciousness of the proletariat. Marginalized and exploited groups often don’t acknowledge or recognize their exploitation, and even when they do, this recognition of shared suffering isn’t a sufficient condition to generate support networks and collective action to counter the structures that oppress and marginalize them. As a feminist, it is deeply saddening to see that solidaristic sisterhood, as desirable as it might be, remains a feminist utopia. Instead of solidarity, women remain likely to engage in competitive behavior. As Charleen Adams wrote in her article “Female Intrasexual Competition: From Demons to Better Angels,” women are very likely to engage in intrasexual competition, most of the times without being aware of the significant psychological, economic, and professional consequences which result.

I am often faced with the question of how to make sense of aggression displayed by other women? In 2013 Emma Brockes questioned why sisterhood and solidarity are so rare when so much attention is directed towards feminist projects. Conventional wisdom in feminist circles suggests that competitive behavior between women exists because they internalize and replicate patriarchy. I believe this explanation is both enlightening and problematic, but, above all, apologetic. In Gender Trouble, Judith Butler argues that understanding gender as a mere construction supposes that women are passive recipients of their gender with little or no agency to overcome the limitations that their gender imposes on them: “If gender is constructed, could it be constructed differently, or does its constructedness imply some form of social determinism, foreclosing the possibility of agency and transformation?”

This same argument is useful here: if women know no better, what can be done? How can we judge, accuse, face or point out aggression when women’s conduct is purely determined by their environment? Do we confront these women or do we help them? Isn’t it patronizing to assume that it is our role to help them because we know better? Butler’s point of view is enlightening, mainly because it emphasizes that patriarchal oppression is structural; however, it is also problematic because it leaves us little space to act. Taken radically, we could not oppose competitive, sexist women without unjustly attributing agency to them that they do not in fact possess. So, what can be done?

Adams concludes that “female intrasexual competition is also subject to reason, once we see our involvement in it, and can be guided by our better angels.” She argues that the possibility of change starts with self-reflection. As a philosopher I am inclined to agree; however, I can’t help thinking of the institutional obstacles that limit the actions prompted by self-reflection. Part of my sensitivity to this comes from personal experience. I was recently informed that a female colleague in a position of power appropriated the gender studies seminar I designed. She argued that such a course should be part of the Humanities rather than the Political Science Department, which I belong to. This colleague, who has been reported for unethical behavior towards female colleagues in the past and who told a student that I knew nothing about my area of expertise, has now been promoted.